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ABSTRACT 
 
The current study looked at the Common Ingroup Identity Model and its link to need for 
closure, a cognitive construct that causes individuals to seek out quick and finite answers. 
Based on previous research, I predicted that participants high in situational and 
dispositional need for closure would be more responsive to the Common Ingroup Identity 
Model than participants who were not. Results indicated that need for closure does not 
have a direct relationship with the model; however, a three-way interaction suggests that 
a more complex relationship may exist. These results give the Common Ingroup Identity 
Model more applicability within real-world situations. The findings also add to previous 
research on need for closure‟s relationship with prejudice reduction and suggest that its 
impact may be limited to techniques focused on intergroup contact. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
“Just then I noticed that almost all the people… were greeting each other, exchanging 
remarks and forming groups – behaving, in fact, as in a club where the company of 
others of one’s own tastes and standing makes one feel at ease.” – Albert Camus, 
L’Etranger 
One of the main focuses of social psychology over its history is the study of 
prejudice. While prejudice research has focused primarily on identifying the different 
types of prejudices, as well as how and why prejudices form, a more applied area of 
prejudice research has developed which looks at ways to reduce prejudice. These 
prejudice reduction techniques look to combat, reduce, or change prejudice attitudes 
through psychological means. One of these techniques is the Common Ingroup Identity 
Model. Because of its focus on the role of categorization in the prejudice development, 
cognitive processes have been linked to this model‟s effectiveness. One cognitive process 
that has not been previously linked to the model is need for closure. The purpose of the 
current study is to look at the moderating effects of need for closure on the effectiveness 
of the Common Ingroup Identity Model. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Prejudice, History, and Psychology 
The term prejudice refers to any preconceived, subjective judgment of a person or 
thing which, whether positive or negative, is not based on actual experiences (Allport, 
1954). Although prejudices are formed prior to experience, they can persist after 
exposure to the prejudice group through different cognitive processes, such as skewed 
perception (Binning & Sherman, 2011) or memory bias (Corneille, Hugenberg, & Potter, 
2007). Many different types of prejudices have been identified, including racism, sexism, 
ageism (Sigelman & Sigelman, 1982), classism, sexual prejudice, religious intolerance 
(Aosved, Long, & Voller, 2009), speciesism (Marcu, Lyons, & Hegarty, 2007), 
weightism (Blaine & McElroy, 2002), and ableism (Smith, Foley, & Chaney, 2008). 
Essentially, any possible categorical parsing of a social setting, which allows for one 
group to be compared to another group, can lead to prejudice. 
Throughout history, these prejudices have played a major role in many significant 
events. Early examples of religious intolerance can be found in the Biblical persecution 
of the Jewish peoples by the Egyptians and Romans, the persecution of early Christians 
by the Romans (and the subsequent persecution of pagans by the then-christened Roman 
Empire), and the Christian Crusades. Racism was at the heart of the colonial strategies of 
many different empires, with racial superiority being one of the main arguments used to 
justify the maltreatment of indigenous peoples in the Americas, Africa, and Australasia. 
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Sexism, while less historically evident, can be seen covertly through laws regarding 
women across different civilizations as well as the 19
th
 century trend of female writers 
(such as the Bronte sisters) to take pen names in order to have their works published. A 
more overt example of historical sexism can be found in the Salem witch trials of the late 
17
th
 century.  
A historical look at psychology shows that prejudice, and more specifically 
sexism and racism, has been a popular topic of research (see Richards, 2010 for a 
review). Interestingly, it was the search for race and sex differences in psychology that 
eventually led researchers to the concepts of prejudice. In Psychology‟s infancy, 
differences between races and genders were assumed to be innate or based on the natural 
evolution of humanity. Therefore, early psychological research was focused on seeking 
out and identifying which areas different races performed differently on (or, more 
specifically, which areas white men performed better than other groups on). This is 
historically referred to as scientific racism. Some exemplars from the field of psychology 
who were heavily involved in early race difference research include Francis Galton and 
Gustav Le Bon. Sex differences in psychology follow the same general trend, with 
psychological differences applied to such physiological phenomenon as brain size, 
menstruation, and the inherent “need” of child-bearing (for example, Romanes, 1887; and 
Spencer, 1861).  
Out of the search for group differences emerged the study of prejudice (Richards, 
2010). The two driving forces behind this shift were cultural pressure and a lack of 
evidence of actual group differences. An emerging African-American and feminine voice 
in American and European society was strongly opposed to the assertion of white male 
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superiority by group difference researchers. At the same time, researchers were actually 
finding no group differences in such studies as the 1898 Cambridge Exposition (Costall, 
1999) and Woodworth‟s 1910 examination of racial differences. These two factors led 
psychologists in the early 1930s to the beginnings of prejudice research: if group 
differences do not actually exist, then something else must be driving the perception that 
they do.  
Covert Racism and Other Prejudices 
Racism is a prejudice of one group of people by another based on the color of 
their skin. Racism is one of the most salient social categories that people use to group 
others, and has been the focus of extensive research in psychology, particularly in 
America (Richards, 2010). This is likely because, in the relatively short history of the 
United States, racism has been at the heart of several important events, such as the Trail 
of Tears, slavery, the Civil War, the Civil Rights movement, and (tangentially) the 
Holocaust. Whatever the reason, racism has remained a popular topic in psychology: an 
April 2012 search for the terms “race”, “racism”, or “racist” on PsycINFO yielded over 
47,000 resulting publications.  
One result of this research has been the identification of different forms that 
racism can be expressed through. Old-fashioned or traditional racism refers to blatant, 
directly racist attitudes and behaviors that characterize the stereotypically racist 
individual (Devine, Plant, & Buswell, 2000). All of the historical examples given above 
are typical of old-fashioned racism. Over time, old-fashioned racism has largely 
disappeared from public attitudes (Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2000), but, in its 
place, new, covert forms of racism have been found.  
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Symbolic racism (and the related concept, modern racism) refers to those racist 
attitudes and behaviors that are exhibited towards members of another race through 
indirect or symbolic manners (Kinder & Sears, 1981; McConahay, 1983). Symbolic 
racists typically exhibit their racist beliefs when an alternative, socially acceptable 
explanation of their behavior is available. Similarly, modern racists exhibit racist 
behaviors when there is ideological and situational ambiguity and race is not the focal 
point of the situation. Some examples of symbolic and modern racism include opposition 
to affirmative action and gay marriage, and the tendency for employers to favor 
applicants of the same race.  
Another covert form of racism is aversive racism (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2005). 
Aversive racism refers to those forms of racism that are not driven by a hatred of people 
of a different race but instead are motivated by a discomfort or aversion with individuals 
from other races. Aversive racists typically express their beliefs unintentionally and 
honestly believe that they are not racist, sometimes even actively supporting racial 
equality. Aversive racism, like symbolic racism, is expressed when an alternative 
explanation is available, but unlike symbolic racism, aversive racism is theorized to be 
more prevalent in political liberals, not conservatives (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). 
These covert types of racism have also been applied to other forms of prejudice. 
Along with their old-fashioned counterparts, researchers have found examples of aversive 
sexism (Ellemers & Barreto, 2009), aversive disablism (Deal, 2007), aversive weightism 
(Brochu, Gawronski, & Esses, 2011), modern sexism (Swim, Aikin, Hall, & Hunter, 
1995), modern homonegativity (Morrison, Kenny, & Harrington, 2005), and modern 
intellectual disablism (Akrami, Ekehammar, Claesson, & Sonnander, 2006).  
6 
 
Prejudice Reduction 
In response to these multiple forms of prejudice and the multiple ways that these 
prejudices can be expressed, psychologists began looking for ways to manipulate or 
reduce the levels of prejudice in prejudiced individuals, by either adjusting their attitudes 
toward or their beliefs about the group being prejudiced against. These manipulations are 
collectively referred to as prejudice reduction techniques. 
One of the first to confront prejudice reduction was Gordon Allport. Although he 
addressed the issue earlier in relation to personality (Allport, 1945), it was his book, The 
Nature of Prejudice (Allport, 1954), which cemented his theory on prejudice reduction. 
In this book, Allport laid out his theory of prejudice, which focused on social and cultural 
influences on personality as well as the emergence of the “self” as a member of an 
ingroup. Allport also introduced what has become known as the contact hypothesis, his 
main theory of prejudice reduction. The contact hypothesis states that, under certain 
conditions, contact between an individual and an outgroup member can lead to reduced 
prejudice attitudes. Allport identified four contingencies of this contact that needed to be 
met for the contact to lead to prejudice reduction: equal status between groups, common 
goals, support from authority, and intergroup cooperation (Paluck & Green, 2009).  
Allport‟s contact hypothesis laid the foundation for virtually all prejudice reduction 
research that came afterwards, with different techniques emphasizing different facets of 
his theory. 
Extensive support has been found in favor of Allport‟s contact hypothesis. 
Intergroup contact has been found to reduce prejudice towards a wide variety of groups, 
including immigrants (Escandell & Ceobanu, 2009), the Amish (McGuigan & Scholl, 
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2007), the elderly (Hale, 1998), political groups (Popan, Kenworthy, Frame, Lyons, & 
Snuggs, 2010), religious groups (Lloyd & Robinson, 2011), and homosexuals (Baunach, 
Burgess, & Muse, 2010). Support has also been found for the conditions of contact that 
Allport identified, though many studies tend to stress only one or two conditions. For 
example, Pettigrew & Tropp‟s (2006) meta-analysis found that studies following 
Allport‟s conditions of contact had significantly higher effect sizes than those studies that 
did not follow the conditions; they also concluded that support from authority was the 
most important condition. However, other researchers have shown evidence that 
intergroup cooperation (Molina & Wittig, 2006) can be the most important of Allport‟s 
conditions.  
In recent years, some researchers have also expanded on the contact hypothesis. 
Pettigrew‟s (1998) Intergroup Contact Theory suggests adding the potentiality of 
friendship as a fifth condition of contact. Schiappa, Gregg, and Hewe‟s (2005) Parasocial 
Contact Hypothesis extends the definition of “contact” to include media consumption, 
such as television shows. Liu‟s (2010) Tri-Relational Contact Model states that contact is 
important for prejudice reduction not only between individuals but also between 
businesses and goods. While these three theories do expand upon Allport‟s original 
hypothesis, none of them abandon or even denigrate his ideas except to show the 
necessity of their particular additions. Additionally, the recency of these new theories is a 
testament to the long-standing impact of Allport‟s theory.  
Other researchers have taken the contact hypothesis as a foundation and created 
their own techniques for reducing prejudice. Some of these techniques stand alone for 
their radical approaches, such as Huang, Sedlovskaya, Ackerman, and Bargh‟s (2011) 
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immunization technique and Olson and Fazio‟s (2006) conditioning procedure of 
reducing automatic racial prejudice. However, most of the prejudice reduction techniques 
that have followed from the contact hypothesis can be grouped into one of two 
approaches. 
The first of these approaches could be labeled the person-oriented approach. 
Techniques that fall under this label seek to reduce or eliminate prejudice by attempting 
to change the prejudiced individual‟s attitudes or beliefs. Many person-oriented 
techniques rely on awareness interventions, where the prejudiced group is highlighted 
and attitudes are presumably changed through increased exposure and understanding of 
the group. For example, Johnson and Johnson‟s (2000) “Three C‟s” technique 
emphasizes increased knowledge of outgroups along with cooperation, conflict 
resolution, and civic values. Aboud and Levy (2000) discuss the benefits of bilingual, 
multicultural education and anti-racism programs. Other person-oriented techniques seek 
to evoke emotions in the prejudiced individual in an attempt to reduce prejudice. Some 
examples of this include the implementation of empathy (Stephan & Finlay, 1999) and 
hostile confrontation (Czopp, Monteith, & Mark, 2006) as prejudice reduction 
techniques. 
While the person-oriented approach to prejudice reduction has been successful 
(for a brief review, see Paluck & Green, 2009), appealing to an individual‟s emotions or 
knowledge is not always effective. For example, Legault, Gutsell, and Inzlicht (2011) 
found that, when they were reminded of the societal pressures controlling prejudice 
beliefs, participants actually exhibited more prejudiced attitudes than those who 
experienced no intervention. Additionally, person-oriented approaches may not 
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adequately address the more covert types of prejudice. Individuals who exhibit some 
forms of covert prejudice, such as aversive racism, are not even aware that they have a 
prejudice. Therefore, prejudice reduction techniques that use intervention or emotion as a 
base may not be as effective. 
The second broad approach that has been used in prejudice reduction research 
since Allport is the social groups approach. The social groups approach is focused largely 
around the interactions between an individual‟s ingroups, or groups that the individual is 
a member of, and the various outgroups (groups that the individual does not belong to) 
that the individual encounters. Ingroup research indicates that prejudices are formed, in 
part, because of perceived differences between one‟s ingroup and outgroups (Gaertner & 
Dovidio, 2000). These prejudices can form because of pro-ingroup biases (where the 
ingroup is viewed more positively than the outgroup), anti-outgroup biases (where the 
outgroup is viewed more negatively than the ingroup), or both (Brewer, 2007). The social 
groups approach to prejudice reduction attempts to manipulate these ingroup-outgroup 
biases, either through decategorization or recategorization. 
Decategorization asks the individual to abandon their ingroups and outgroups 
altogether and instead judge others based on their individual merits (Gaertner & Dovidio, 
2000). Techniques that focus on decategorization rely on small groups or one-on-one 
interdependent interactions, usually with the potentiality of friendship. Probably the most 
famous decategorization technique is the jigsaw classroom (Aronson, 2004). The jigsaw 
classroom forces the child to cooperate with others by breaking schoolwork into pieces 
and requiring them to work together in order to learn. The jigsaw creates an 
interdependent learning situation which encourages the child to ignore stereotypes, 
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establish friendships, and reduce their prejudice attitudes. Decategorization is a common 
technique for reducing prejudice (see, for example, Berryman-Fink, 2006; Fiske, 2000; 
and Miller, Brewer, & Edwards, 1985), and its utility in reducing prejudice against 
specific individuals of an outgroup is well-established. 
However, these techniques become troublesome when decategorization is applied 
to an entire outgroup. Research has shown that interdependence and decategorization 
typically have a strong reduction effect on specific individuals from an outgroup, but that 
these individual effects do not generalize well to others from that individual‟s outgroup 
(Bratt, 2008; Miller et al., 1985). Because of this, decategorization alone is not the 
optimal approach to prejudice reduction when considering an outgroup as a whole. 
In contrast to decategorization, which asks the individual to abandon groups altogether, 
recategorization asks the individual to recategorize themselves and outgroup members so 
that their original ingroup and outgroup become part of a new, more inclusive group 
(Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000).  
The Common Ingroup Identity Model 
The current study focuses on one of these social group reorganization techniques: 
the Common Ingroup Identity Model. However, before discussing the model itself, two 
theories of prejudice that the model is influenced by should be briefly mentioned.  
Social Identity Theory 
Tajfel and Turner‟s (1979) Social Identity Theory was one of the first major 
theories to directly follow from Allport‟s discussion of ingroup bias.  Social Identity 
Theory (SIT) states that each individual has an identity that they create for themselves 
about their place in the social environment and that this social identity is based on a 
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summation of all the social categories that the individual belongs to. Because we all want 
to view ourselves in a positive light, SIT posits that people are motivated to create a 
positive social identity for themselves, and that this positive identity is formed through 
comparisons with outgroups.  
SIT also makes a distinction between personal identity and what is termed the 
“collective identity” (Hirose, Taresawa, & Okuda, 2005; Hogg & Williams, 2000). 
Collective identity refers to the identity created by the individual that is concerned with 
the needs and goals of their ingroup as opposed to the needs and goals of the actual 
individual. By creating a collective identity, the individual identifies more closely with 
those individuals in the ingroup, causing differences within the group to be minimalized 
and similarities between the individual and outgroups to be highlighted (Gaertner & 
Dovidio, 2000). In tandem, these two processes lead to intergroup prejudice. 
As an example of SIT‟s mechanisms at work, researchers have examined the role 
of nationalism in the evocation of a collective identity and the enhancement of prejudiced 
attitudes. In a study conducted in Germany, the presence of the German flag increased 
outgroup prejudice for participants who were highly nationalistic (Becker, Enders-
Comberg, Wagner, Christ, & Butz, 2012). A separate study that examined anti-Semitism 
in Europe concluded that most anti-Semitic attitudes are based on a nationalistic view 
that Jewish people are a threat to the national self-image (Bergmann, 2008). These two 
studies exemplify the potential downside of the collective identity: when the individual is 
minimized and the group is accentuated, people who are not members of the group can 
become victims of prejudiced attitudes. 
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This collective identity can also be used as a weapon to combat prejudice. As 
previously stated, the collective identity causes individuals within a group to feel more 
similar than they actually are (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). This, in turn, causes prejudices 
against those who are not members of the group, as they are perceived as being more 
dissimilar than they actually are. However, a prejudice reduction technique that attempted 
to expand the original group to include individuals who were previously categorized as 
outgroup members could potentially circumvent the prejudice formation inherent in the 
collective identity.  
Optimal Distinctiveness Theory 
Brewer‟s (1991) Theory of Optimal Distinctiveness expands on research into SIT. 
Optimal Distinctiveness Theory (ODT) states that an individual forms their social 
identity through the contradictory psychological needs of differentiation and assimilation. 
In other words, an individual simultaneously wants to feel that they are unique and 
different as well as part of a positive and cohesive group. These two processes are 
hypothesized to lay on a continuum and that there is a point somewhere in the middle of 
the continuum where differentiation and assimilation are being optimally satisfied. This 
point is referred to as the point of optimal distinctiveness and it is most easily satisfied by 
membership in groups of intermediate size because they allow the individual to feel as if 
they are part of a group but that their personal impact can still be felt.  
Optimal distinctiveness can also be a cause of intergroup bias. Social groups best 
satisfy the needs for belongingness and distinctiveness when they are perceived as being 
positive and distinct in relation to outgroups (Brewer, 1991). In turn, these intergroup 
comparisons can lead to ingroup favoritism and, consequently, prejudice. ODT has been 
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linked to prejudices based on gender (Eckes, Trautner, & Behrendt, 2005), nationality 
(Vignoles & Moncaster, 2007), ethnicity (Henderson-King, Henderson-King, Zhermer, 
Posokhova, & Chiker, 1997), and self-stereotyping (Pickett, Bonner, & Coleman, 2002). 
Common Ingroup Identity  
Gaertner and Dovidio‟s (2000) Common Ingroup Identity Model is a social 
groups model of prejudice reduction that follows from these two theories of intergroup 
prejudice as well as from Allport‟s original contact hypothesis of prejudice reduction. 
The Common Ingroup Identity Model states that when members of different groups are 
induced to see themselves as members of an overarching, inclusive group rather than as 
completely separate groups, attitudes towards former outgroup members will become 
more positive by promoting pro-ingroup biases.  
Instead of looking to reduce negative outgroup attitudes, the Common Ingroup 
Identity Model is focused on extending the benefits of ingroup membership to former 
outgroup members. These benefits include ingroup homogeneity (where ingroup 
members are viewed as being more similar than they actually are), improved facial 
recognition, and increased empathy, positive affect, and helping behaviors (Gaertner & 
Dovidio, 2000). 
While the Common Ingroup Identity Model aims to reduce prejudice through 
recategorization, the model does not propose to eliminate these previously-
conceptualized groups. Expecting individuals to completely ignore prejudice-inducing 
groups like race, sex, or age is impractical. Instead, the Common Ingroup Identity Model 
proposes that we constantly categorize others into many different categories, and, by 
making a more inclusive category salient to the individual, those categorizations that 
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promote prejudice attitudes will be superseded (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). This is also 
known as the dual identity model of categorization. Gaertner and Dovidio suggest that, 
by allowing for a dual identity, the Common Ingroup Identity Model can account for 
generalization problems that have been found with Allport‟s contact hypothesis. 
Maintaining a dual identity allows the individual to keep differences between subgroups 
in mind while also acknowledging the similarities that bind these subgroups together into 
the superordinate group.  
A few examples should help to clarify the concepts behind the Common Ingroup 
Identity Model. In a study examining the relationship between a common ingroup and 
intergroup threat (Riek, Mania, Gaertner, McDonald, & Lamoreaux, 2010), participants 
were asked to indicate how much they perceived Whites and Blacks as one group 
(Americans) or as two separate groups (Caucasian-Americans and African-Americans). 
Intergroup threat was measured with two scales, one measuring realistic threat 
(perceptions of competition) and the other measuring symbolic threat (perceptions of 
different values). According to the Common Ingroup Identity Model, participants who 
viewed the two racial groups more as one group than as separate groups should have 
more positive interracial views and experience less intergroup threat. This is what their 
results showed: stronger feelings of a common identity were related to lower levels of 
bias, with the relationship being mediated by intergroup threat. 
A separate study looked at the effects of a common ingroup identity on nationality 
bias in the United Kingdom (Stone & Crisp, 2007). After priming their inherent British 
nationality, participants were presented with the outgroup “French people” and the 
superordinate identity “European”, meant to include both British and French peoples. 
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Results showed that high identification with the European superordinate group was 
associated with more positive feelings about the former outgroup (French people). A 
follow-up study found that the relationship between group identification and outgroup 
bias was mediated by perceived similarity to the outgroup. Therefore, the significant 
finding that high European identification led to more positive feelings to the outgroup 
was partially because of an increased feeling of similarity to the former outgroup. This is 
congruent with the Common Ingroup Identity Model, which states that perceived 
similarity between groups should reduce negative intergroup bias and increase positive 
feelings towards the outgroup (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). 
A third example shows the Common Ingroup Identity Model‟s applications in the 
workplace (Cunningham, 2005). In this study, assistant coaches from various college 
sports teams were asked to indicate how cohesive they perceived the coaching staff for 
their team to be, with higher cohesion indicating a common ingroup identity. Participants 
were then asked to complete a questionnaire about their satisfaction with their coworkers. 
Results showed that coworker satisfaction significantly increased as perceptions of a 
common ingroup identity increased, further exemplifying the benefits of a common 
ingroup identity and extending these benefits to an applied setting. 
In summary, the Common Ingroup Identity Model seeks to reduce intergroup 
prejudice by creating or highlighting an overarching group that includes both the ingroup 
and the outgroup (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). Common ingroup identity primarily aims 
not to reduce negative bias against the former outgroup, but to extend the positive bias of 
ingroup membership to these former outgroup members. Additionally, by maintaining the 
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subgroups that the common ingroup supercedes, the model allows for prejudice reduction 
without eliminating the distinctiveness that a subgroup potentially offers its members. 
Common Ingroup Identity and specific prejudices. The Common Ingroup 
Identity Model has been applied to multiple types of prejudices. When it was originally 
conceptualized, the Common Ingroup Identity Model was based around aversive racism 
(Gaertner & Dovidio, 2005), and many studies employing the model are centered on 
reducing this specific prejudice. For example, in a field experiment at the University of 
Delaware, Nier et al. (2001) looked at the impact of a common ingroup identity on survey 
compliance at a sports event. In this study, interviewers, half of whom were Black, half 
of whom were White, asked people on their way to the game whether they would be 
willing to fill out a survey. Common ingroup was manipulated through school affiliation: 
half of the interviewers wore a hat with the University of Delaware logo on it, and half of 
the interviewers wore a hat with the other team‟s logo on it. The manipulation worked, as 
fans complied with the request significantly more often when the interviewer was 
affiliated with their school than when they were not. However, there was also an effect of 
race: Black interviewers were significantly more likely to be complied with when they 
shared the university affiliation with the fan than when they did not, a result that was not 
found for White interviewers. This effect was also in the expected direction, with Blacks 
sharing a common ingroup being afforded more prosocial behaviors as opposed to Black 
outgroup members being shown more negative social behaviors. Similar results for 
reducing racism have been found under correlational (Gaertner, Rust, Dovidio, Bachman, 
& Anastasio, 1994) and experimental conditions (Dovidio et al., 2004). 
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Another common application of the Common Ingroup Identity Model has been in 
artificially-induced prejudices between experimentally-created groups (see, for example, 
Cunningham & Chelladurai, 2004; Dovidio, Gaertner, Isen, & Lowrance, 1995; Dovidio 
et al., 1997, and Mottola, Bachman, Gaertner, & Dovidio, 1997). An obvious drawback 
of these experimentally-created groups is that they are lacking in external validity. 
Groups created by the experimenter, by definition, do not exist outside of the experiment. 
However, artificial prejudices are popular in prejudice reduction research because of their 
ease of manipulation and high internal validity. The ease with which ingroups and 
outgroups can be arbitrarily created in experimental settings is indicative of the power of 
categorization and recategorization. 
The Common Ingroup Identity Model has also been extended to real-life 
prejudices outside of racism and laboratory-induced prejudice. For example, Houlette et 
al. (2004) examined the effectiveness of the “Green Circle Program”, a prejudice 
intervention being implemented at a Delaware elementary school. The Green Circle 
program asks children to think about themselves within a “circle” that also includes the 
people that the child cares about. After the child creates their circle, the facilitator points 
out people that the child may have neglected in their original circle; the child is then 
allowed to expand their circle to include these people. As the program progresses, the 
child continues to expand their circle until it is inclusive of all humanity. While the Green 
Circle program is not a direct product of the Common Ingroup Identity Model, the two 
share a common goal (prejudice reduction) and a common ground on how to reach that 
goal (expanding the ingroup to include those that were previously perceived as 
“different”). 
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Results from the Green Circle study found that, while they still preferred 
playmates that were similar to them, children who participated in the program were more 
willing to choose playmates that differed from them, suggesting a broader ingroup in 
terms of friend selection (Houlette et al., 2004). Additionally, prejudice reduction was 
found not only in terms of racism, but also in regards to sex and weight. The Common 
Ingroup Identity Model has also been linked to prejudice reduction in terms of ethnicity 
(Levin, Sinclair, Sidanius, & Van Laar, 2009), regionalism (Maas, Ceccarelli, & Rudin, 
1996), class status (Nadler, Harpaz-Gorodeisky, & Ben-David, 2009), and political 
affiliation (Gaertner et al., 1999). These studies provide evidence of the usefulness of 
common ingroup identities outside of experimentally-created prejudices. 
Common Ingroup Identity and cognition. Some cognitive processes have been 
linked to the Common Ingroup Identity Model. One obvious cognitive process that has 
been consistently linked to the model is categorization (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; 2005), 
and, more specifically, social categorization (Cunningham, 2005). Social categorization 
allows individuals to figure out where they fit into the world by creating distinct 
categories and then placing themselves and others into these categories. While this 
process is important for the creation of a social identity, it is also conducive to prejudice 
through comparisons between ingroups and outgroups (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). The 
Common Ingroup Identity Model uses categorization as a tool for reducing prejudice: by 
creating or priming a more inclusive category, differentiation between groups is 
eliminated and prejudice is reduced (Crisp, Turner, & Hewstone, 2010). 
A more application-based cognitive mechanism that has been linked to the 
Common Ingroup Identity Model is priming. Priming refers to the ability of a stimulus to 
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cause a future, related association to be more effectively activated (Gaertner & Dovidio, 
2000). In terms of a common ingroup identity, priming refers to the ability of incidental 
experiences to trigger thoughts and emotions in relation to ingroups and outgroups, as 
well as the potential manipulations of these experiences to reduce prejudice. For example, 
one study looked at the effects of ingroup and outgroup designators on evaluations of 
positive and negative traits (Perdue, Dovidio, Gurtman, & Tyler, 1990). In this study, 
participants were primed with pronouns that either denoted an ingroup orientation (e.g., 
“we”, “us”) or an outgroup orientation (e.g., “they”, “them”). Participants were then 
asked to evaluate whether a trait was positive (“helpful”, “courteous”) or negative 
(“impolite”, “sloppy”). Results indicated a priming effect: participants primed with 
ingroup pronouns identified positive traits significantly faster than participants primed 
with outgroup pronouns, and participants primed with outgroup pronouns identified 
negative traits significantly faster than participants primed with ingroup pronouns.  
Need for Closure 
One cognitive tool that has not been previously linked to the Common Ingroup 
Identity Model is need for closure, also known as need for cognitive closure. Need for 
closure (NFC) refers to the motivational need for individuals to find clarity, definition, 
and structure in their environments and their interactions with others (Kruglanski, 
Webster, & Klem, 1993). Because of this need to find clarity, the individual is urged to 
find answers to any ambiguous questions that they encounter, even if this leads them to 
inaccurate or factually wrong answers (Taris, 2000). NFC also causes the individual to 
shut out information that runs contrary to their currently accepted answer, which, in the 
case of incorrect answers, can lead to a stubborn acceptance of false beliefs (Kruglanski 
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& Webster, 1996). Individuals high in NFC have been found to prefer quick answers 
(Wiersema, van der Schalk, & van Kleef, 2011), view intergroup relations competitively 
(De Zavala, Cislak, & Wesolowska, 2010), display more group centrism (Orehek et al., 
2010), and prefer order and predictability (Van Hiel & Mervielde, 2003). In contrast, 
individuals low in NFC tend to be less decisive, more open-minded, and more creative 
(Chirumbolo, Livi, Mannetti, Pierro, & Kruglanski, 2004). 
NFC is proposed to consist of several sub-processes. Kruglanski and Webster 
(1996) describe the process of seizing and freezing that defines the way an individual 
high in NFC would process information. Seizing, also known as the urgency tendency, 
refers to the individual‟s need to reach a conclusion as quickly as possible, while 
freezing, also called the permanence tendency, encourages the individual to persist in 
their conclusion by closing it off from any further scrutiny. In tandem, seizing and 
freezing are posited to cause reduced information processing and increased stereotyping, 
outcomes that are consistent with those linked to high NFC. 
Additionally, in creating a scale measuring dispositional NFC, Webster and 
Kruglanski (1994) identified five factors: preference for order, preference for 
predictability, decisiveness, discomfort with ambiguity, and closed-mindedness. In terms 
of these subscales, individuals high in NFC prefer order and predictability, show more 
discomfort with ambiguity, and are more decisive and closed-minded, while individuals 
low in NFC score in the opposite direction.  
NFC has been identified as a personality variable. As previously mentioned, 
Webster and Kruglanski (1994) developed the Need for Closure Scale with the intent of 
measuring individual differences in NFC. The scale has shown high reliability and 
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validity, and, along with its obvious implications for NFC research, the scale has been 
used in studies measuring such related concepts as information processing style 
(Blanchard-Fields, Hertzog, & Horhota, 2012), right-wing attitudes (Onraet, Van Hiel, 
Roets, & Cornelis, 2011), religious fundamentalism (Gribbins & Vandenberg, 2011), and 
consumer search behavior (Houghton & Grewal, 2000). 
However, NFC has also been used as a situation-dependent variable in various 
experiments. One common manipulation to heighten NFC is the creation of time pressure 
(De Grada, Kruglanski, Mannetti, & Pierro, 1999). By making time pressure salient, such 
as by giving participants a deadline to reach a decision, individuals can be induced to 
make quick, decisive answers in a similar manner as those who are high in dispositional 
NFC. For example, a study by Wiersema et al. (2011) looked at NFC‟s effect on artistic 
preferences using participants under time pressure as their high NFC condition. Results 
showed that participants under time pressure evaluated figurative paintings significantly 
higher than abstract paintings, supporting their hypothesis that participants high in NFC 
would prefer art with a clear and obvious meaning. Similar situational inductions of NFC 
have been used in studies looking at cognitive structure (Van Hiel & Mervielde, 2003) 
and terrorism (Orehek et al., 2010).  
Additionally, while NFC has been found to be a distinct cognitive process, the 
construct has been linked to other cognitive processes. In their study examining the 
validity of the Need for Closure Scale, Webster and Kruglanski (1994) found that NFC 
was correlated with, but distinct from, scales measuring such things as authoritarianism, 
dogmatism, impulsivity, need for structure, and need for cognition. While many of the 
items in these scales appeared to measure similar constructs, the overall processes were 
22 
 
deemed distinct. For example, NFC and authoritarianism overlapped significantly for 
four of the Need for Closure Scale‟s factors, but not for the fifth (closed-mindedness). 
The closed-mindedness factor of NFC has also been linked to openness to experience 
(Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). However, while openness to experience is strictly 
considered to be a personality trait, NFC is viewed as both a trait and a situation-
dependent variable. 
Need for Closure and Prejudice  
Prejudices rely on stereotypical definitions given to entire categories of 
individuals or objects. These stereotypes are typically determined through the same types 
of shallow processing that are seen in high NFC individuals (Wiersema et al., 2011). 
Therefore, with its reliance on closed-mindedness and categorization, and its link to 
shallow processing, it is not surprising to find that NFC has been linked to prejudice. In a 
study looking at the link between NFC and sexism, Roets, Van Hiel, and Dhont (2011) 
found that differences in this cognitive style were predictive of sexist attitudes. A similar 
study found a link between NFC, right-wing authoritarianism, and racist attitudes (Van 
Hiel, Pandelaere, & Duriez, 2004). In both studies, the link was explained through the 
processes underlying NFC in general: individuals high in NFC tend to seize an answer 
once they find one and then are unwilling to change that answer. In terms of social 
groups, this leads high NFC individuals to seize and freeze upon prejudices and 
stereotypes as they are the most readily available.  
NFC has also been examined in terms of the underlying processes behind 
prejudice attitudes. For example, in a study looking at aggression towards an outgroup as 
a product of NFC and political affiliation (De Zavala et al., 2010), NFC was found to 
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cause an interaction between political affiliation and outgroup hostility, with 
conservatives high in NFC responding significantly more aggressively than all other 
groups. The researchers posited that, because individuals high in NFC are intolerant of 
ambiguous situations, the interaction caused participants to interpret ambiguity as conflict 
and to act aggressively in response. Similar studies have found that individuals high in 
NFC show increased competitiveness and hostility towards outgroups (De Zavala, 
Federico, Cislak, & Sigger, 2008), higher perceptions of racial homophily (Flynn, 
Reagans, & Guillory, 2010), and more stereotypical judgments (Dijksterhuis, van 
Knippenberg, Kruglanski, & Schaper, 1996). 
NFC has even been suggested as the motivational cognitive process underlying 
prejudice that was originally theorized by Gordon Allport in The Nature of Prejudice 
(Roets & Van Hiel, 2011). In his book, Allport (1954) discussed a theoretical motivated 
cognitive style that creates prejudice-prone individuals. According to Allport, individuals 
with this cognitive style would look for quick, definitive answers, be prone to persevering 
beliefs, prefer order and familiarity, be more decisive and intolerant of ambiguity, and 
exhibit closed-mindedness. These exact traits have been discussed as the underlying 
mechanisms and subsets of NFC. Allport also stated that individuals with this cognitive 
style would believe social groups were more homogenous than they actually were; 
studies on NFC have shown that individuals high in NFC perceive groups to be more 
homogenous (Dijksterhuis, et al., 1996; Flynn et al., 2010). While Allport‟s eerie 
accuracy in predicting this cognitive style is impressive, the more important implications 
of these findings are that NFC has a definitive motivational tie to prejudice attitudes. 
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Need for Closure and Prejudice Reduction  
While research into NFC‟s effect on prejudice reduction techniques has only 
recently just begun, preliminary studies suggest that NFC may be a surprising moderator 
for the effectiveness of prejudice reduction. For example, Dhont, Roets, and Van Hiel 
(2011) conducted five studies on the moderating effects of NFC on the prejudice 
reduction capabilities of intergroup contact. In each of these studies, a moderation effect 
was found, with participants high in NFC being more responsive to intergroup contact as 
a means of reducing prejudice than participants low in NFC. These findings seem to run 
counter to the theory behind NFC: individuals high in the construct should seemingly 
seize and freeze upon their stereotypical beliefs and, therefore, be less responsive to 
prejudice reduction techniques. However, the authors propose that intergroup contact as a 
prejudice reduction technique is able to avoid the tendency to seize and freeze because 
contact does not confront the individual with what is “right” or “wrong”. Intergroup 
contact also allows the individual high in NFC to reduce their ambiguity about a 
stereotype by clarifying or fixing their stereotypical construct. 
 To my knowledge, this is the only study that has examined the relationship 
between NFC and prejudice reduction. However, the findings of this study give a 
direction to future research into this relationship. The results support research into other 
techniques stemming from intergroup contact, suggesting that techniques relevant to 
contact may be more effective for individuals with high levels of NFC. The results also 
suggest that high NFC may increase the effectiveness of prejudice reduction techniques, 
which seems counterintuitive but is empirically supported (Dhont et al., 2011). Of course, 
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these directions are reliant on a single article that discusses five studies, so more research 
is necessary to improve the validity of the research. 
Rationale 
The biggest problem facing the Common Ingroup Identity Model is its 
applicability outside of the laboratory and over a long-term basis. The model has found 
considerable evidence in experimental settings, using both artificial and real social 
groups. However, some have questioned the real-world feasibility of a prejudice 
reduction technique that aims to supersede such powerful, socially-ingrained categories 
as race, sex, and ethnicity (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). The study of cognitive variables 
such as NFC in terms of the Common Ingroup Identity Model could help identify what 
situations and dispositions enhance the effectiveness of the model in the real world. 
Situations inducing NFC, such as salience of terrorism (Orehek et al., 2010) and time 
pressure (De Grada et al., 1999), have been shown to enhance both ingroup identification 
and interdependence with others. In terms of disposition, high levels of NFC have 
previously been linked to higher levels of effectiveness with other prejudice reduction 
techniques (Dhont et al., 2011). Therefore, in a real world setting, the Common Ingroup 
Identity Model could be tailored more effectively if used in tandem with a heightened 
NFC situation (such as time pressure) or if targeted towards high NFC individuals 
specifically. 
Hypotheses 
Based on previous findings about the effects of inducing a common ingroup 
identity on prejudice attitudes (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000), I predicted that participants 
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who were asked to think of an outgroup member as part of a shared ingroup would 
exhibit lower levels of prejudice attitudes than participants who were not asked to do so. 
Additionally, based on previous research into NFC and prejudice (De Zavala et al., 2008; 
Orehek et al., 2010), I predicted that participants high in dispositional NFC would exhibit 
higher levels of prejudice attitudes than participants low in dispositional NFC. I also 
predicted that participants in a time pressure situation (a manipulation shown to invoke 
heightened NFC; De Grada et al., 1999) would exhibit higher levels of prejudice attitudes 
than participants under normal circumstances. 
Finally, based on the preliminary link between NFC and prejudice reduction 
(Dhont et al., 2011), and the links between the Common Ingroup Identity Model and 
cognition (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000), I predicted that NFC would moderate the 
effectiveness of the Common Ingroup Identity Model on prejudice reduction. 
Specifically, I predicted that participants with higher levels of dispositional NFC would 
be more responsive to the intervention than participants with lower levels of NFC. I also 
predicted that participants induced into a high NFC state would be more responsive to the 
intervention than participants not so induced. Finally, I predicted that participants high in 
dispositional NFC who are induced into a high NFC state would show the largest 
decrease in prejudice attitudes under the Common Ingroup Identity Model. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
METHOD 
 
Participants 
Participants were 44 undergraduate students (9 males, 35 females; 4 African-
Americans, 40 Caucasians) at Eastern Kentucky University who were given partial 
course credit for their participation in the study. Participants were recruited online via the 
EKU Sona system. Participants were randomly assigned to a Time Pressure condition (19 
Time Pressure, 25 No Pressure) and an Ingroup condition (20 Ingroup, 24 Outgroup). 
Average age was 20.6 (SD = 5.0). 
Additionally, 300 undergraduate students at EKU participated in the online 
version of part one of the study. Participation in the online version of part one did not 
require participation in part two; therefore, only 18 of these participants were used to test 
the hypotheses. However, these participants were included in the post-hoc validation of 
the fifteen-item Need for Closure scale (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011b). Demographic 
information was not collected for part one participants unless they completed part two.  
Materials 
Dispositional Need for Closure  
Dispositional NFC was measured using a fifteen-item version of the Need for 
Closure scale (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011b; Cronbach‟s  = .87). The fifteen-item scale was 
developed from Webster & Kruglanski‟s (1994) original, 42-item Need for Closure 
Scale. Example items from this scale are, “I don‟t like situations that are uncertain”, and 
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“When I have made a decision, I feel relieved” (see Appendix A for all items). 
Participants rated items using a 5-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly 
agree). Mean ratings on scale items were obtained for each participant, with overall 
higher scores indicating higher levels of NFC. For data used to test the hypotheses, mean 
ratings were 3.44 (SD = .63); for data used in the post-hoc validation, mean ratings were 
3.52 (SD = .53). For use in the MANOVA analysis, a dichotomous variable was created, 
splitting participants into a high or low condition that was determined by the overall 
median (3.40). 
Self-Esteem 
Self-esteem was measured using a ten-item version of the Rosenberg Self-Esteem 
scale (Rosenberg, 1965; Cronbach‟s  = .91). Example items from this scale are, “I feel 
that I have a number of good qualities,” and “I wish I could have more respect for 
myself” (see Appendix B for all items). Participants rated items using a 5-point Likert 
scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). Items 2, 5, 6, 8, and 9 were reverse-
coded. Mean ratings on scale items were obtained for each participant, with overall 
higher scores indicating higher self-esteem. For data used in the post-hoc validation, 
mean ratings on this scale were 3.89 (SD = .79). 
Conscientiousness  
Conscientiousness was measured using a ten-item version of the 
conscientiousness subscale of the Big-Five Personality Test (Goldberg, 1992; Cronbach‟s 
 = .82). Example items from this scale are, “I am always prepared,” and “I make a mess 
of things” (see Appendix C for all items). Participants rated items using a 5-point Likert 
scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). Items 2, 6, 8, and 10 were reverse-
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coded. Mean ratings on scale items were obtained for each participant, with overall 
higher scores indicating higher levels of conscientiousness. For data used in the post-hoc 
validation, mean ratings on this scale were 3.53 (SD = .65). 
Extraversion 
Extraversion was measured using a ten-item version of the extraversion subscale 
of the Big-Five Personality Test (Goldberg, 1992; Cronbach‟s  = .92). Example items 
from this scale are, “I feel comfortable around people,” and “I am quiet around strangers” 
(see Appendix D for all items). Participants rated items using a 5-point Likert scale (1 = 
strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). Items 1, 3, 6, 7, and 10 were reverse-coded. Mean 
ratings on scale items were obtained for each participant, with overall higher scores 
indicating higher levels of extraversion. For data used in the post-hoc validation, mean 
ratings on this scale were 3.14 (SD = .90). 
Guilt Questionnaire 
Prejudice was measured using a five-item Guilt Questionnaire (Appendix E). This 
questionnaire was administered as the operational definition of the dependent variable, 
meant to measure prejudice. The questionnaire was adapted from a similar design used by 
Sommers and Ellsworth (2000), with items tailored to better fit a scenario involving the 
Olympics. The first four items on the scale are, “The results of the tests conducted by the 
IOC are probably correct,” “I believe Mendoza when he says that he is clueless as to the 
test results,” “I believe that Mendoza is guilty of doping,” and “Mendoza should have 
been stripped of his medal.” The fifth item of the scale asks participants to indicate which 
punishment they believe that the athlete should receive. Participants rated items using a 
7-point Likert scale (for items 1-4, 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree; for item 5, 
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choices are the severity of punishment, from 1 = no punishment, to 7 = lifetime ban). Item 
2 was reverse-coded. Mean ratings on items 1-4 were obtained for each participant, with 
overall higher scores indicating higher levels of prejudice attitudes (M = 4.81, SD = 
1.21). Higher scores on item 5 indicate more severe levels of punishment (M = 3.45, SD 
= 1.45). 
Big-Five Personality Test 
A 100-item version of the Big Five Personality Test (Goldberg, 1992) was present 
in the study to enhance the time pressure manipulation. The questionnaire was not 
actually administered in the study, but a stack of the questionnaire was kept on the table 
near the researcher. See Appendix F for all items. The questionnaire uses a 9-point Likert 
scale (1 = extremely inaccurate, 9 = extremely accurate), with higher scores indicating 
higher levels of that personality dimension. The presence of this questionnaire was 
simply to create the illusion that the participant had more surveys to fill out than they 
actually do, which may have increased feelings of time pressure for participants in the 
time pressure condition. 
Procedure 
The procedure for the current study underwent two notable changes. Participant 
recruitment was taking significantly longer than expected under the original procedure, so 
a procedural change was made to put part one of the study online. After this change was 
implemented, participant recruitment remained at an extremely low rate. Therefore, a 
second procedural change was made to allow part two (which required in-person 
participation) to be visible on the sign-up list prior to completion of Part One. 
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Protocol One  
Participants signed up for the study online via the Sona system, where it was 
listed under the name "Personality and the Olympics." The study consisted of two parts, 
both of which were conducted in-person. Participants signed up for both parts upon initial 
sign up. 
After participants arrived for Part One of the study, I handed out the Part One 
Consent Forms (Appendix G) and followed this script: 
Hello. My name is Bradlee Gamblin. I am a graduate student here at EKU, and 
this study is for my graduate thesis. Thank you for coming today. This is part one 
of a two-part study. Before we begin, I will read you the consent form that you 
were given when you arrived. You are welcome to read along if you would like. 
(Read Consent Form). In part one of this study, you will be asked to fill out four 
short surveys about your personality. Please do not write your name on the 
surveys. Do you have any questions before we begin? (Answer questions). We will 
now begin. Your responses are anonymous, and there are no right or wrong 
answers. Please try to be honest. 
Participants were then given the Need for Closure Scale (Roets & Van Hiel, 
2011b), the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965), and a version of the 
Conscientiousness and Extraversion subscales of the Big-Five Personality Test 
(Goldberg, 1992). After completing the surveys, participants were given the Part One 
Debriefing Form (Appendix H) which explained what the four scales measured and 
reminded them that they still needed to complete part two of the study. 
32 
 
When participants arrived for the second part of the study, I handed out the Part 
Two Consent Forms (Appendix I) and followed this script:  
Hello. My name is Bradlee Gamblin. I am a graduate student here at EKU. Thank 
you for participating in my study today. Before we begin, I will read you the 
consent form that you were given when you arrived. You are welcome to read 
along if you would like. (Read Consent Form). In this study, you will be asked to 
read an article about something that happened at this past summer’s Olympic 
Games. The passage is from an Associated Press news article printed in the 
Lexington Herald-Leader. You will then be asked to fill out a questionnaire 
pertaining to what you have read as well as a few questionnaires about your 
personality. Please do not write your name on any of the questionnaires. Do you 
have any questions before we begin? (Answer questions). We will now begin. The 
purpose of this study is to find out opinions on some procedures used in this 
summer’s Olympics. Your responses are anonymous, and there are no right or 
wrong answers. Please try to be honest. 
Participants were then presented with a simulated news article (Appendices J and 
K). For participants in the Ingroup condition, the athlete was labeled as being from the 
United States. For participants in the Outgroup condition, the accused was simply 
referred to as an Olympic athlete. There were no other differences in the article between 
conditions. This ingroup manipulation was based on past research that has shown that a 
common ingroup can have an effect on opinions (Stone & Crisp, 2007) as well as 
research into aversive racism in the courtroom (Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000).  
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After the participants read the article, they were asked to summarize the article 
using a Summary Sheet they were provided (Appendix L). The purpose of the summary 
was to give participants an opportunity to re-read the article and, potentially, take further 
note of the athlete‟s status as either an outgroup or an ingroup member. After participants 
had completed their summary, the situational NFC manipulation was implemented. A 
similar procedure to that used by De Grada et al. (1999) was followed. For participants in 
the Time Pressure condition, I followed this script: 
Now you will answer a few questionnaires about this crime and fill out a 
personality questionnaire. Before you all arrived today, the janitors came up to 
me and told me that they would need to clean this room at about (state the time 
that the study began). I informed them that I had already scheduled the room for 
research at that time, but that I would let you all know and try to finish with 
enough time for them to clean. I am only telling you because there’s another 
group coming in at (state the next 30-minute block of time), and I want to try to let 
them in here between your two groups. Of course, still answer to the best of your 
ability and answer honestly. 
Participants in the No Pressure condition were only informed that they would be 
answering a few questionnaires and given a reminder to answer honestly.  
After the time pressure manipulation was implemented, participants were given a 
questionnaire assessing the guilt of the athlete from the article (Appendix E). The 
questionnaire was adapted from a similar design used by Sommers and Ellsworth (2000), 
with items tailored to better fit the Olympic scenario. Participants were then given a 
demographics sheet (Appendix M).  
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At this point, the study was complete. Participants were then given the Part Two 
Debriefing Form (Appendix N), which I read to them. After asking for and answering any 
questions the participants had, I thanked them for participating in the study and informed 
them that they were free to leave.  
Protocol Two  
A procedural change was implemented one month into data collection in an 
attempt to increase participant sign-up rates. Participants seemed hesitant to sign up for a 
study that required committing to two in-person meetings, and studies conducted online 
(at least at EKU) have much higher participation rates than those conducted in-person. 
Therefore, the study was changed from being listed as one study with two in-person 
meetings to two separate studies, with Part One being conducted online and Part Two 
being conducted in-person. 
Under Protocol 2, participants signed up for Part One of the study online under 
the name "College Student Opinions, Attitudes, and Personalities." Part One was 
administered online via the EKU Sona system. 
After participants signed up for the study, the study automatically began. 
Participants were first presented with the Online Consent Form (Appendix O), which was 
slightly modified from the original Part One Consent Form (Appendix G) to indicate that 
Part One was now being listed as a separate study. 
Participants then completed the 15-item Need for Closure Scale (Roets & Van 
Hiel, 2011b), the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965), and a version of the 
Conscientiousness and Extraversion subscales of the Big-Five Personality Test 
(Goldberg, 1992). After completing the surveys, participants were presented with the 
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Online Debriefing Form (Appendix P), which explained what the four scales measured 
and informed them that a separate study (part two of the full study) was available for 
sign-up. Because the original protocol explicitly told participants that parts one and two 
were related to each other, the mention of the second study does not seem to create a 
confound. After being presented with their debriefing forms, participants had completed 
Part One. 
Once participants had completed Part One of the study, a separate study, entitled 
“Psychology at the Olympic Games,” was made available to them on the Sona system. 
This study represented Part Two of the full study, and was conducted in-person. 
When participants arrived, they were given an In-Person Consent Form 
(Appendix Q). The remaining procedure for Part Two was identical to that used in the 
original protocol, except that the debriefing form was slightly changed to reflect the 
administration of Part One online (see Appendix R) and the 15-item Need for Closure 
scale (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011b) was administered a second time in order to look for 
differences in NFC scores between the Time Pressure and No Pressure conditions.  
Protocol Three 
A second procedural change was made one month after Protocol Two had been 
implemented. Again, this change was done in an attempt to increase participation in the 
study.  
The only change between Protocol Two and Protocol Three was that participants 
were able to view and sign up for Part Two of the full study before having completed Part 
One. This change was made in order to allow Part Two to be visible to participants upon 
their initial viewing of the EKU Sona sign-up page. I feared that participants were 
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signing up for all of their studies at once and were therefore never seeing Part Two at all 
(since Part Two was invisible to participants until they had completed Part One). 
Other than this change, the procedure for Protocol Three was the same as Protocol Two. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
RESULTS 
 
Dependent Measures 
 Before testing the hypotheses, preliminary analyses were conducted on the 
dependent variables to test for reliability and similarity. First, a reliability analysis was 
conducted on the four items of the Guilt Questionnaire to test for inter-item consistency. 
Results showed a Cronbach‟s  of .89, indicating good internal consistency. 
Next, bivariate correlations were obtained between the Guilt Questionnaire and 
the Punishment variable. Logically, participants who assign higher levels of guilt to the 
athlete should also assign higher levels of punishment to the athlete. Results confirmed 
this, showing that Guilt was positively correlated with Punishment (r = .56, p = .00), 
indicating a significant and moderate relationship between the two dependent variables.  
The strong relationship between the two dependent variables may suggest that 
they should be collapsed into a single variable. However, they measure separate 
constructs. The four items of the Guilt variable asked participants for their attitudes 
towards the athlete, while the Punishment item asked participants to assign a level of 
punishment to the athlete. Therefore, the variables were kept separate to test the 
hypotheses, and multivariate analyses were conducted. 
Hypothesis Analysis 
To test the hypothesized main effects of the ingroup manipulation, time pressure 
manipulation, and dispositional NFC, and the hypothesized interactions between these 
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variables, on the Guilt and Punishment dependent variables, a 2 X 2 X 2 Multivariate 
Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) was conducted. Specifically, I expected to find that 
participants in the Ingroup condition would have lower scores on the DVs than the 
Outgroup condition, that participants in the No Pressure condition would have lower 
scores on the DVs than the Time Pressure condition, that participants low in 
dispositional-NFC would have lower scores on the DVs than participants high in 
dispositional-NFC, that participants high in dispositional-NFC or in a high-NFC situation 
would be more responsive to the Common Ingroup Identity Model, and that participants 
high in dispositional-NFC who were in a high-NFC situation would be the most 
responsive to the model.  
Results of the multivariate omnibus tests yielded a significant main effect of 
Ingroup, F = 3.61, p = .04, 
2
 = .22, but no significant main effects for Time Pressure, F 
= 1.65, ns (for Punishment, MTimePressure = 3.29, SD = .39, MNoPressure = 3.50, SD = .31; for 
Guilt, MTimePressure = 5.07, SD = .35, MNoPressure = 4.53, SD = .27), or Dispositional NFC, F 
= .24, ns (for Punishment, MLowNFC = 3.23, SD = .31, MHighNFC = 3.56, SD = .39; for Guilt, 
MLowNFC = 4.76, SD = .28, MHighNFC = 4.84, SD = .34). The omnibus tests also revealed no 
significant interactions between any two of the three variables (FIngroupXTimePressure = .44, 
FIngroupXDispositional = 1.00, FTimePressureXDispositional = .60, all ps ns); however, the three-way 
interaction revealed a finding approaching significance, F = 2.53, p = .10, 
2
 = .16. 
Therefore, follow-up univariate tests were conducted for the Ingroup main effect and the 
three-way interaction effect. 
The results of the univariate tests revealed no significant main effect of Ingroup 
on either Punishment (F = 3.19, ns; MIngroup = 2.95, SD = .36; MOutgroup = 3.84, SD = .34) 
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or the Guilt Questionnaire (F = .43, ns; MIngroup = 4.94, SD = .32; MOutgroup = 4.66, SD = 
.31). Results also showed no significant three-way interaction for Punishment (F = 3.97, 
ns). However, a significant interaction was found for scores on the Guilt Questionnaire (F 
= 4.31, p = .05, 
2
 = .14). Participants in the No Pressure condition who were high in 
Dispositional NFC evaluated the athlete as being more guilty when they were told that he 
was an American (M = 5.70, SD = .53) than those who were not (M = 3.79, SD = .45), 
while participants low in Dispositional NFC gave the athlete higher guilt ratings when no 
country of origin was specified (M = 4.88, SD = .59) than when he was labeled as an 
American (M = 3.75, SD = .59) (see Figures 1 and 2). In comparison, Guilt scores were 
relatively stable across Ingroup conditions and dispositional NFC for participants in the 
Time Pressure condition. These results suggest that, without time pressure, participants 
respond differently to the Common Ingroup Identity Model depending on their levels of 
dispositional NFC.  
While these results are significant, they are in the opposite direction predicted by 
the current study‟s hypothesis. Therefore, the hypothesis that participants high in 
dispositional NFC who are placed in a high NFC situation will be most responsive to the 
Common Ingroup Identity Model was not supported. 
Post-hoc Analyses 
Two-Way Univariate Analysis of Variance  
Results showed a p-value approaching significance for the three-way interaction 
of Ingroup, Time Pressure, and Dispositional NFC, and univariate analyses revealed a 
significant three-way interaction for Guilt in which participants in the Time Pressure 
condition showed fairly stable scores regardless of Ingroup condition or dispositional  
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Figure 1. Ingroup X Time Pressure Effect on Guilt Scores for Low-NFC Participants. 
  
 
Figure 2. Ingroup X Time Pressure Effects on Guilt Scores for High-NFC Participants. 
 
 
 
Guilt Scores 
Guilt Scores 
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NFC, while participants in the No Pressure condition showed inverse reactions to the 
Ingroup manipulation dependent upon their dispositional NFC level. Therefore, it was 
hypothesized that, when excluding participants in the Time Pressure condition, a 
significant interaction would be found between Ingroup and Dispositional NFC for Guilt. 
Specifically, I predicted that participants high in dispositional NFC would score higher 
on the Guilt Questionnaire when in the Ingroup condition, and that participants low in 
dispositional NFC would score higher on the Guilt Questionnaire when in the Outgroup 
condition. 
To test this hypothesis, a 2 X 2 Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was conducted 
on participants in the No Pressure condition, with Dispositional NFC and Ingroup as the 
independent variables and Guilt scores as the dependent variable. Results revealed a 
significant interaction effect, F = 8.09, p = .01, 
2
 = .34. A simple main effect analysis 
was conducted to test for mean differences in the Ingroup condition between participants 
high and low in NFC. As predicted, participants high in NFC had higher Guilt scores (M 
= 5.70, SD = .69) than participants low in NFC (M = 3.75, SD = 1.88) (see Figure 3). 
Although this difference was not statistically significant (t = -2.17, p = .07), this is likely 
due to the very low numbers that each cell had been reduced to after eliminating 
participants in both the Time Pressure and Outgroup conditions. Therefore, the post-hoc 
hypothesis that, when not under time pressure, participants respond to the Common 
Ingroup Identity Model inversely depending on their level of dispositional NFC was 
partially supported. 
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Figure 3. Ingroup X Dispositional NFC Effects on Guilt Scores, Excluding Time 
Pressure. 
 
Validation of the 15-Item Need for Closure Scale  
Once Protocol Two was implemented, Part One of the study was administered 
completely online. This new protocol changed the presentation of the full study from one 
two-part study into two separate studies, allowing participants to complete Part One 
without being obligated to complete Part Two. Because of this, as well as the much 
higher participation rate for online studies at EKU in comparison to in-person studies, the 
vast majority of participants who completed Part One online  (282 out of 300) were not  
used to test the hypotheses. However, these participants were able to be used in a post-
hoc validation of the new 15-item Need for Closure scale (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011b). 
A reliability analysis was conducted to test for inter-item consistency. Results showed a 
Cronbach‟s  of .80, indicating good internal consistency for the measure. In their 
Guilt Scores 
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analysis, Roets and Van Hiel (2011b) found a Cronbach‟s  of .87, a similar (if slightly 
higher) coefficient. 
Next, bivariate correlation analyses were conducted between the 15-item Need for 
Closure Scale (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011b) and conscientiousness and extraversion, two 
variables that have been previously linked to NFC. Results showed that NFC was 
positively correlated with conscientiousness (r = .24, p = .00) and negatively correlated 
with extraversion (r = -.16, p = .01). Roets and Van Hiel‟s validation study found similar 
results for conscientiousness, but their analysis indicated no significant relationship with 
extraversion. This may be the result of a difference between the extraversion and 
conscientiousness scales: the versions used in the current study are only ten items long 
and were originally chosen as simple filler surveys. 
Finally, a confirmatory factor analysis with Varimax rotation was conducted to 
test the five-factor structure of the 15-item Need for Closure Scale (Roets & Van Hiel, 
2011b). The original 42-item Need for Closure Scale (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994) has 
been found to consist of five factors. Results showed that 11 of the 15 items loaded onto 
their associated factors: Factor 1 was Preference for Order, Factor 2 was Preference for 
Predictability, Factor 3 was Closed-Mindedness, Factor 4 was Decisiveness, and Factor 5 
was Discomfort with Ambiguity (see Table 1 for factor loadings). Eigenvalues for the 
five factors were 4.30, 1.49, 1.39, 1.23, and 0.89, respectively, and they explained over 
62% of the variance in the items. 
The fact that four of the items did not load onto their respective factors is not 
necessarily problematic. While the items on the 15-item scale were chosen to include 3 
items from each of the five factors, each specific item was chosen because of its  
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Table 1. Confirmatory Factor Analysis with Varimax Rotation on the 15-Item Need for 
Closure Scale. 
Predicted 
Item Factors 
Order Predictability Closed-
Mindedness 
Decisiveness Discomfort 
with 
Ambiguity 
Order 1 .785 .207 -.017 .140 .166 
Order 2 .838 .136 .071 .091 .084 
Order 3 .851 .106 .112 .058 .043 
Predictability 
1 
.212 .681 .064 .233 .111 
Predictability 
2 
.051 .421 .613 .113 -.055 
Predictability 
3 
.351 .608 .362 .065 .149 
Closed-
Mindedness 1 
.065 .097 .220 -.012 .800 
Closed-
Mindedness 2 
.186 -.030 .667 .118 .057 
Closed-
Mindedness 3 
-.058 -.010 .638 -.139 .107 
Decisiveness 
1 
.054 -.027 -.212 .704 .142 
Decisiveness 
2 
.197 .226 .088 .719 -.072 
Decisiveness 
3 
.025 .353 .284 .610 .019 
Ambiguity 1 .159 .119 -.076 .078 .814 
Ambiguity 2 .071 .783 -.116 .062 .057 
Ambiguity 3 .175 .486 .254 .306 .350 
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relevance to NFC overall, not because it was representative of the factor. Roets and Van 
Hiel (2011b) actually envisioned their shortened Need for Closure Scale as consisting of 
one dimension. Therefore, it is impressive that a CFA is still capable of loading most of 
the items onto their corresponding factors and makes the shortened scale even more 
similar to the original than the authors may have anticipated. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The Common Ingroup Identity Model (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000) is an important 
contribution to prejudice reduction research. When applicable, the model provides a 
systematic tool for subverting negative outgroup stereotypes and avoiding group biases. 
The process of recategorization forces the individual or group to think about previous 
outgroup members as being a part of a shared ingroup. This shared ingroup is the catalyst 
for prejudice reduction in the model: pro-ingroup biases that were originally used by the 
individual to create favoritism against the outgroup members is now employed in tandem 
with the previous outgroup members, affording them prosocial benefits such as improved 
face recognition and increased empathy. 
However, translating the well-documented laboratory results supporting the 
Common Ingroup Identity Model (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000) to real-world situations can 
be problematic. For example, Rutchick and Eccleston (2010) investigated the effects of a 
common ingroup identity on persuasive appeals made by outgroup members. Their 
results showed that, because Democrats and Republicans conceive of the superordinate 
group “Americans” differently, a persuasive appeal from the political outgroup was not 
convincing when they invoked a common ingroup. A similar limitation to the model has 
been found in relation to Hurricane Katrina (Dach-Gruschow & Hong, 2006). Other 
limitations include the impact of the subgroup‟s perceived role in the superordinate group 
(Sindic & Reicher, 2009), the impact of subgroup homogeneity on superordinate-level 
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bias (Cunningham, 2006), and the creation of new, shared outgroup conflicts once a 
common ingroup has been formed (Kessler & Mummendey, 2001). 
 Investigating cognitive variables, such as NFC, in relation to the Common 
Ingroup Identity Model enables researchers the opportunity to account for at least some 
of the variation that the model would encounter in real-life scenarios. Some aspects of 
cognition, such as categorization (Cunningham, 2005) and priming (Perdue et al., 1990), 
have been previously linked to the model. However, the relationship between the model 
and NFC, a motivational need to find clarity and structure (Kruglanski et al., 1993), had 
not been previously explored. Because of its known ties to prejudice (e.g., De Zavala et 
al., 2010) and preliminary links to another prejudice reduction technique (Dhont et al., 
2011), the current study looked into a potential link between NFC and the Common 
Ingroup Identity Model. 
The current study investigated the effects of both dispositional (Kruglanski et al., 
1993) and situational (De Grada et al., 1999) NFC on the Common Ingroup Identity 
Model (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). Specifically, I predicted that individuals evaluating 
an athlete under a common ingroup label would assess him more favorably than 
individuals who were given no ingroup label. I also predicted that individuals low in 
either dispositional or situational NFC would give more favorable assessments than 
individuals high in NFC. Finally, I predicted three interactions: individuals high in either 
dispositional or situational NFC would be more responsive to the model than individuals 
low in NFC, and individuals high in both dispositional and situational NFC would show 
the largest decrease in prejudice attitudes under the model.  
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Results of the current study found support for none of the proposed hypotheses. In 
terms of both situational and dispositional NFC, no significant relationship was found for 
either the prejudice or discrimination measures. This goes against previous findings about 
dispositional NFC‟s ties to prejudice (De Zavala et al., 2010; Flynn et al., 2010), although 
past research has not looked at dispositional NFC‟s links to prejudice in terms of a 
target‟s guilt. Therefore, the current study provides evidence that dispositional NFC‟s 
known relationship with prejudice and discrimination may not extend to the realm of 
guilt assessment or punishment administration. On the other hand, situational NFC‟s link 
to prejudice and discrimination has not previously been examined. Therefore, the current 
study suggests that situational NFC does not share dispositional NFC‟s direct relationship 
with prejudice or discrimination. 
Additionally, while multivariate omnibus results revealed a significant effect of 
the ingroup manipulation, univariate analyses failed to find significance for either of the 
two dependent variables. These results go against the vast majority of findings in support 
of the Common Ingroup Identity Model‟s impact on prejudice and discrimination (e.g., 
Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000), suggesting another potential boundary condition for the 
model related to evaluations of guilt. However, the punishment variable did approach 
significance, with lower scores being found in the Ingroup condition. This indicates a 
trend in the data in the direction of the proposed hypothesis, and, given a larger 
participant pool, results for the punishment variable may have reached significance. 
The predicted two-way interactions between situational and dispositional NFC 
and the Common Ingroup Identity Model were also not supported by the data. As there 
has been only one previous study into NFC‟s effects on prejudice reduction (Dhont et al., 
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2011), and the prejudice reduction technique used in that study was different than the one 
used here, these results do not go against any previous findings. However, the current 
study does suggest that the results of the previous study, which showed that individuals 
higher in NFC were more responsive to intergroup contact, cannot be generalized to 
prejudice reduction techniques in general. However, this does not necessarily mean that 
the findings of the prior study are isolated only to intergroup contact. There are 
significant differences between intergroup contact and common ingroup identity as 
prejudice reduction methods: intergroup contact explicitly relies on interactions with an 
outgroup member (Allport, 1954), while the Common Ingroup Identity Model attempts to 
cognitively subvert the outgroup label altogether through the process of recategorization 
(Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). Therefore, the results of the current study only suggest that 
NFC‟s effects on prejudice reduction may be limited to techniques that rely on contact. 
The predicted three-way interaction between situational NFC, dispositional NFC, 
and the Common Ingroup Identity Model was also not supported. However, a result 
approaching significance was found in the multivariate omnibus tests, and univariate 
results revealed an interesting, unpredicted three-way interaction for the Guilt DV. 
Participants in the Time Pressure condition appear to give relatively stable scores 
regardless of dispositional-NFC and Ingroup condition; however, participants in the No 
Pressure condition showed inverse reactions to the common ingroup manipulation, which 
was dependent on their levels of dispositional-NFC.  
In other words, the effects of dispositional-NFC and the Ingroup manipulation 
seem to have been washed out when participants were placed into the time pressure 
condition, causing participants to rate the athlete‟s guilt based on something other than 
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their NFC levels or the athlete‟s ingroup status. For example, a potential criterion that 
participants may have used under time pressure was an evaluation of the merits of the 
two arguments given in the article. 
Conversely, when participants were placed into the No Pressure condition, they 
had enough time to both evaluate the athlete‟s ingroup status and allow the effects of 
dispositional NFC to distort their evaluations of the athlete‟s guilt. Under this 
assumption, it appears that participants responded in opposite directions to the Ingroup 
manipulation depending on whether they were high or low in dispositional NFC, with 
participants high in NFC rating the athlete as more guilty when a common ingroup 
identity was evoked. A post-hoc analysis, which excluded participants in the Time 
Pressure condition, supported this. Therefore, the current study suggests that, under 
normal conditions, while the model is effective for individuals low in dispositional NFC, 
the use of a common ingroup identity to reduce prejudice in individuals high in 
dispositional NFC may actually cause an increase in prejudice. 
Finally, a post-hoc validation of the 15-item Need for Closure Scale (Roets & Van 
Hiel, 2011b) was able to replicate most of the findings of the original validation study, 
including good reliability and a positive correlation with conscientiousness. A 
confirmatory factor analysis was also able to correctly extract the majority of the five-
factor model that the original Need for Closure Scale (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994) is 
theorized to consist of. Therefore, the current study was able to give support to the use of 
the shortened scale as a valid replacement of the original, 42-item scale. 
Overall, the current study adds to the literature on NFC‟s ties to prejudice and 
prejudice reduction, to the literature on the Common Ingroup Identity Model, and to the 
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literature on the 15-item Need for Closure Scale (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011b). Results 
indicate that the relationship between NFC and prejudice may not extend to the realms of 
guilt and punishment. Additionally, NFC‟s tentative link to prejudice reduction may be 
limited to those methods involving intergroup contact, as no effect was found between 
NFC and the Common Ingroup Identity Model. If anything, participants high in 
dispositional NFC may actually respond negatively to the evocation of a common ingroup 
identity. Results also revealed guilt and punishment assessment as potential boundary 
conditions of the Common Ingroup Identity Model, although a larger participant pool 
likely would have found significance for the punishment variable. Finally, a post-hoc 
validation of the 15-item Need for Closure Scale provided evidence to support its use in 
place of the original, 42-item scale. 
Limitations 
The major limitation of the current study is that there are not enough participants 
per cell to expect much in the way of significant findings. The minimum suggested 
number of participants needed in order to draw real conclusions is 20 per cell (Simmons, 
Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011); in contrast, the current study varied between 7 and 2 
participants per cell in the three-way interaction. Because of this, all results, both 
significant and insignificant, should be viewed as preliminary and only suggestive of a 
potential trend that the results may follow once more data have been collected. 
Another limitation of the current study is that the participant pool being used is 
not representative of the general population. For example, data on demographics revealed 
that the sample was 76% female and 87% Caucasian, numbers that do not match those of 
the rest of the United States. Additionally, all participants were undergraduate students at 
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EKU who were enrolled in a psychology course, making generalization to non-collegiates 
and other geographic areas even more problematic. Future research should explore a 
more diverse population, consisting of a more proportional number of men and non-
collegiate individuals. 
A third limitation to the current study is that small procedural changes were 
implemented in the midst of data collection. Originally, the study was conceived as an in-
person study, administered at two separate points in time. This was changed to put the 
first part of the study online; later, mandatory completion of Part One before Part Two 
was removed in order to increase visibility of the second part of the study. These 
procedural changes were done in an attempt to increase participant interest in the study, 
as participants seemed hesitant to sign up for a study requiring two in-person meetings. 
The decision was at least a partial success: 26 participants signed up for Part Two of the 
study since the first procedural change, and 300 participants signed up for the online 
version of Part One. While most of those 300 participants could not be used for the 
primary analysis, I was able to include them in a post-hoc analysis that tested the validity 
of the 15-item Need for Closure Scale (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011b). Regardless, these 
procedural changes should be noted and considered when discussing the results of the 
study. 
A fourth limitation is that the manipulations may not have been strong enough. 
The common ingroup manipulation relied only on the addition of five mentions of the 
United States within a page-long story that otherwise had nothing to do with the athlete‟s 
country of origin. Therefore, the ingroup manipulation may not have been strong enough 
to force the participant to view the athlete as an ingroup member. The time pressure 
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manipulation may also have been problematic. One explanation for a failure to induce 
time pressure is that participants are expecting odd situations to arise during their 
participation in psychological studies and, therefore, assumed that the time pressure 
speech was part of the study. Another potential explanation is that participants simply did 
not feel rushed by the janitor scenario, either because it was unbelievable or because they 
were not concerned about finishing in time. Insignificant results between the Time 
Pressure and No Pressure conditions suggest that one of these explanations may be true; 
if so, future research will want to use a stronger time pressure manipulation. 
A fifth limitation of the current study has to do with the dependent variables. The 
current study proposed to investigate the impact of NFC on the Common Ingroup Identity 
Model‟s ability to reduce feelings of prejudice towards an outgroup. However, the 
dependent variables were based upon the evaluation of a single outgroup individual. 
While the Guilt Questionnaire did ask for participants attitudes towards the athlete, none 
of the attitude questions were directed towards the athlete‟s outgroup in general (i.e., “I 
would expect athletes like Mendoza to be cheaters,” or “Just looking at Mendoza, I would 
think he was a cheater.”). The Punishment variable was explicitly a measure of 
discrimination, not prejudice, because it was concerned with a participant‟s actions, not 
their beliefs. Therefore, the amount of strictly prejudicial attitudes that was measured in 
the current study is debatable.  
Pertaining to the post-hoc validation of the 15-item Need for Closure Scale (Roets 
& Van Hiel, 2011b), a few limitations are worth mentioning. First, no demographic 
information was collected in the current study for participants in the online version of 
Part One unless they went on to participate in Part Two. Therefore, demographic 
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information is essentially unknown for the post-hoc sample. Second, the 
Conscientiousness and Extraversion scales that were used in the correlational analysis 
each included only ten items and were originally included in the study to give the 
participant extra work to do and diffuse the relationship between the scale and the rest of 
the study. Because of this, and potential differences between the Conscientiousness and 
Extraversion scales used in the original study, the differences in significance and strength 
between the current study and the original study are not necessarily indicative of a 
problem with the shortened version of the scale. Finally, only two scales were used in the 
correlational analysis. Ideally, the correlational section of the analysis would have 
included more variables with known links to NFC, as well as the original version of the 
Need for Closure Scale (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). 
Future Directions 
 The results of the current study provide researchers looking into NFC, the 
Common Ingroup Identity Model, or both with some direction. One direction that should 
be investigated is the impact of dispositional NFC on the Common Ingroup Identity 
Model in the absence of a situational NFC manipulation. An evaluation of the three-way 
interaction showed that the creation of time pressure caused scores on the dependent 
variables to become essentially washed out. When participants in the Time Pressure 
condition were excluded from the analysis, a significant interaction was found between 
dispositional NFC and a common ingroup identity. Future research should eliminate the 
time pressure manipulation and examine the effects of dispositional NFC on the Common 
Ingroup Identity Model in order to see if the post-hoc results of the current study hold in 
a dedicated experiment. 
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Assuming that these post-hoc results are replicated, the adverse effect of evoking 
a common ingroup identity on high-NFC individuals should be investigated in terms of 
what is causing the adverse effect. One potential cause is that high NFC participants 
viewed the common ingroup identity of “American” as having an unspoken racial 
requisite and that, because he was violating this racial requisite, the athlete‟s identity as 
an American was invalid (similar to the findings of Rutchick & Eccleston, 2010). A 
second explanation could be that the tendency for high NFC individuals to seize and 
freeze on an answer when they are given one (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996) caused the 
high NFC participants to seize and freeze on the first paragraph of the article, which 
stated that the athlete had been stripped of his medal for doping.  
Once the cause of the adverse effect is identified, future research could look into 
methods of counteracting the effect. For example, if the term “American” has racial 
implications, a different common ingroup should be used when dealing with outgroup 
members of a racial minority. If the seizing and freezing explanation were found to be 
true, then journalists attempting to write unbiased pieces could account for this effect by 
beginning their articles with evidence for both sides of the story. Regardless of what 
factor is truly causing the adverse effect of a common ingroup identity on high NFC 
individuals, being able to account for it would improve the effectiveness of the CIIM. 
Another direction that should continue to be explored is the link between NFC 
and various prejudice reduction techniques. The need to find clarity and structure in the 
environment and through interactions with others can be a powerful motivator 
(Kruglanski et al., 1993), and, because of its links to prejudiced attitudes (De Zavala et 
al., 1999), the NFC variable may help researchers explain why an individual would 
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continue to fall back on stereotypes and prejudice, even after being given evidence that 
goes against their beliefs. Investigating NFC in relation to prejudice reduction allows 
researchers to account for this motivational need and tailor their techniques to be more 
effective when dealing with individuals high in NFC.  
The current study found limited support for NFC‟s impact on the effectiveness of 
recategorization. However, previous research has found a stronger link between NFC and 
intergroup contact (Dhont et al., 2011). Therefore, future research may want to 
investigate NFC in relation to more contact-driven techniques, such as the Parasocial 
Contact Hypothesis (Schiappa et al., 2005), the jigsaw classroom (Aronson, 2004), and 
techniques involving the implementation of empathy (e.g., Stephan & Finlay, 1999). 
Another direction that future research could follow pertains to the interaction 
between situational and dispositional NFC. Previous research has largely ignored this 
interaction, with researchers instead choosing to work with one or the other. While it may 
not be necessary to account for both types of NFC when using the variable, it is at least 
worth investigating the interaction between the two concepts. For example, future 
research could test whether individuals high and low in dispositional NFC respond 
similarly or differently when placed into a high-NFC situation. The results of the current 
study suggest that there is no interaction between the two versions of NFC; however, 
these results were concerned specifically with scores on the guilt and punishment 
variables. An interaction between situational and dispositional NFC could easily exist 
outside of the dependent variables that were measured in this study. Therefore, a 
dedicated experiment into a NFC interaction would be worthwhile. 
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Future research into the Common Ingroup Identity Model (Gaertner & Dovidio, 
2000) may benefit from an exploration of other cognitive, motivational, and personality 
variables with links to prejudiced attitudes. The model has shown problems in its 
implementation when applied to real-world situations (e.g., Dach-Gruschow & Hong, 
2006). One way that researchers can try to alleviate these problems is by attempting to 
account for variables that would make an individual more or less likely to respond 
positively towards the model. For example, if a teacher was able to identify certain 
personality traits or motivational tendencies that caused a student to be less responsive to 
the model, they could account for these variables when implementing the model to make 
it more effective for that specific individual. Therefore, research into relevant individual 
difference variables could help shape the Common Ingroup Identity Model into a 
technique with more real-world applicability. 
A fifth direction that future research can pursue is attitudes towards athletes who 
have been accused of doping. There has been some previous research into the topic: one 
study found that, in recent years, attitudes towards doping in sports have become less 
rigid, with non-athletes adopting more tolerant opinions on the issue (Vangrunderbeek & 
Tolleneer, 2010). However, the current study suggests that attitudes towards doping are 
still quite negative. The mean for the Guilt Questionnaire was nearly five (out of seven) 
across all conditions, and the average recommended punishment for the athlete was that 
he be stripped of his medal. While these results do not indicate complete intolerance of 
doping from all participants, they do suggest that most participants are unsympathetic to 
the plight of athletes who have been accused of doping and that participants believe they 
should be punished. Future research should investigate attitudes towards doping in a 
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general population sample to see whether they have continued to decrease, stagnated, or 
become more negative. Additionally, with the emergence of Lance Armstrong‟s doping 
scandal in national news (Lindsey, 2012), it would be interesting to see if the fact that 
these allegations are being brought against a national icon is enough to alter reactions 
towards doping in general and, if so, whether this were a byproduct of recategorization. 
Conclusions 
The Common Ingroup Identity Model (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000) is a diverse 
and useful tool for psychologists in their attempts to reduce prejudice and discrimination. 
The model‟s reliance on recategorization, in which the individual is asked to think of 
outgroup members instead as part of a superordinate ingroup, gives administrators 
flexibility in their manipulation of the common ingroup identity, and the use of 
superordinate identities allows for a multiplicity of choices when deciding upon a 
common ingroup. The model‟s use of subtle, unobtrusive manipulations, like clothing 
similarity (Dovidio et al., 1995) or the way in which an outgroup member is referred to 
(e.g., Stone & Crisp, 2007), should also be attractive to administrators because 
participants are not likely to exhibit the negative reactions that sometimes accompany the 
more blatant prejudice reduction techniques (e.g., Legault et al., 2011). 
The investigation of cognitive and personality variables in relation to the 
Common Ingroup Identity Model allows the model to become even more relevant to real 
world situations. For example, the cognitive evaluation of the terms “American” and 
“White American” as being analogous to each other (Dach-Gruschow & Hong, 2006) 
makes the use of the former as a common ingroup identity problematic. The ability of 
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researchers to account for these variables allows for the creation of a more dynamic real-
world technique for reducing prejudice. 
The current study looked at the Common Ingroup Identity Model‟s relationship 
with NFC, one of these cognitive variables. Results suggest that NFC does not have a 
direct effect on the model, but that a more complex relationship may exist, in which 
levels of dispositional NFC causes inverse reactions to a common ingroup identity. These 
results provide a foundation for further research into NFC‟s effects on the Common 
Ingroup Identity Model. The results also extend research into NFC‟s ties to prejudice 
reduction in general, suggesting that its impact may be limited to techniques that rely on 
intergroup contact. While further research is necessary to fully understand NFC‟s effects 
on the Common Ingroup Identity Model, the current study provides a direction for future 
research into the model‟s relationship with cognitive variables. 
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Need for Closure Scale 
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Read the following statements and choose how much you agree or disagree with each 
based on your beliefs and opinions about yourself. Please type the number corresponding 
to your agreement with each statement, with 1 meaning you strongly disagree with the 
statement and 5 meaning you strongly agree with the statement. 
 
1 – strongly disagree 
2 – somewhat disagree 
3 – neutral  
4 – somewhat agree 
5 – strongly agree 
 
1. I don‟t like situations that are uncertain. _____ 
 
2. I don‟t like questions which could be answered in many different ways.  _____ 
 
3. I find that a well-ordered life with regular hours suits my temperament. _____ 
 
4. I feel uncomfortable when I don‟t understand the reason why an event occurred in my 
life.  _____ 
 
5. I feel irritated when one person disagrees with what everyone else in a group believes. 
  _____ 
 
6. I don‟t like to go into a situation without knowing what I can expect from it. 
  _____ 
 
7. When I have made a decision, I feel relieved. _____ 
 
8. When I am confronted with a problem, I‟m dying to reach a solution very quickly. 
  _____ 
 
9. I would quickly become impatient and irritated if I would not find a solution to a 
problem immediately. _____ 
 
10. I don‟t like to be with people who are capable of unexpected actions. _____ 
 
11. I dislike it when a person‟s statement could mean many different things. _____ 
 
12. I find that establishing a consistent routine enables me to enjoy life more. ____ 
 
13. I enjoy having a clear and structured mode of life. _____ 
 
14. I do not usually consult many different opinions before forming my own. ____ 
 
15. I dislike unpredictable situations. _____ 
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APPENDIX B: 
Self-Esteem Scale 
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Read the following statements and choose how much you agree or disagree with each 
based on your beliefs and opinions about yourself. Please type the number corresponding 
to your agreement with each statement, with 1 meaning you strongly disagree with the 
statement and 5 meaning you strongly agree with the statement. 
 
1 – strongly disagree 
2 – somewhat disagree 
3 – neutral  
4 – somewhat agree 
5 – strongly agree 
 
1. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself. _____ 
 
2. At times, I think I am no good at all.  _____ 
 
3. I feel that I have a number of good qualities. _____ 
 
4. I am able to do things as well as most other people. _____ 
 
5. I feel I do not have much to be proud of. _____ 
 
6. I certainly feel useless at times. _____ 
 
7. I feel that I‟m a person of worth, at least on an equal plane with others. _____ 
 
8. I wish I could have more respect for myself. _____ 
 
9. All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure. _____ 
 
10. I take a positive attitude toward myself. _____ 
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APPENDIX C: 
Conscientiousness Scale 
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Read the following statements and choose how much you agree or disagree with each 
based on your beliefs and opinions about yourself. Please type the number corresponding 
to your agreement with each statement, with 1 meaning you strongly disagree with the 
statement and 5 meaning you strongly agree with the statement. 
 
1 – strongly disagree 
2 – somewhat disagree 
3 – neutral  
4 – somewhat agree 
5 – strongly agree 
 
1. I am always prepared. _____ 
 
2. I leave my belongings around.  _____ 
 
3. I pay attention to details. _____ 
 
4. I get chores done right away. _____ 
 
5. I like order. _____ 
 
6. I make a mess of things. _____ 
 
7. I follow a schedule. _____ 
 
8. I often forget to put things back in their proper place. _____ 
 
9. I am exacting in my work. _____ 
 
10. I shirk my duties. _____ 
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Read the following statements and choose how much you agree or disagree with each 
based on your beliefs and opinions about yourself. Please type the number corresponding 
to your agreement with each statement, with 1 meaning you strongly disagree with the 
statement and 5 meaning you strongly agree with the statement. 
 
1 – strongly disagree 
2 – somewhat disagree 
3 – neutral  
4 – somewhat agree 
5 – strongly agree 
 
1. I don‟t talk a lot. _____ 
 
2. I feel comfortable around people.  _____ 
 
3. I keep in the background. _____ 
 
4. I don‟t mind being the center of attention. _____ 
 
5. I am the life of the party. _____ 
 
6. I am quiet around strangers. _____ 
 
7. I don‟t like to draw attention to myself. _____ 
 
8. I start conversations. _____ 
 
9. I talk to a lot of different people at parties. _____ 
 
10. I have little to say. _____ 
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The next few questions pertain to the doping case you have just read about in the news 
article. While we understand that other information is necessary to assess the guilt of the 
athlete, we would like you to answer a few questions about the athlete‟s guilt based on 
the information you have been provided. Remember that your responses are anonymous, 
and try to answer honestly. 
 
Please circle the number corresponding to your choice. 
 
1. The results of the tests conducted by the IOC are probably correct. 
 
1                     2                     3                     4                     5                     6                    7 
Strongly                                                  Not Sure                                                  Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                      Agree 
 
2. I believe Mendoza when he says that he is clueless as to the test results. 
 
1                     2                     3                     4                     5                     6                    7 
Strongly                                                  Not Sure                                                  Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                      Agree 
 
3. I believe that Mendoza is guilty of doping. 
 
1                     2                     3                     4                     5                     6                    7 
Strongly                                                  Not Sure                                                  Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                      Agree 
 
4. Mendoza should have been stripped of his medal. 
 
1                     2                     3                     4                     5                     6                    7 
Strongly                                                  Not Sure                                                  Strongly 
Disagree                                                                                                                      Agree 
 
5. Please indicate with a checkmark which punishment, if any, you believe the athlete 
deserves. Select only one. 
 
___ No punishment: I believe Mendoza should have retained his medal. 
___ He should be fined, but should be allowed to keep his medal. 
___ He should be stripped of his medal. 
___ He should receive a substantial fine from the IAAF. 
___ He should receive a two year ban from all international shot put competition. 
___ He should be banned for life from the Olympics. 
___ He should be banned for life from all international shot put competition. 
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Please use this list of common human traits to describe yourself as accurately as possible. 
Describe yourself as you see yourself at the present time, not as you wish to be in the 
future. Describe yourself as you are generally or typically, as compared with other 
persons you know of the same sex and of roughly your same age. 
 
Before each trait, please write a number indicating how accurately that trait describes 
you, using the following rating scale: 
 
1 = extremely inaccurate                                                                   6 = slightly accurate 
2 = very inaccurate                                 5 = neither                          7 = quite accurate 
3 = quite inaccurate                                                                           8 = very accurate 
4 = slightly inaccurate                                                                       9 = extremely accurate 
 
Active _____ 
Agreeable _____ 
Anxious _____ 
Artistic _____ 
Assertive _____ 
Bashful _____ 
Bold  _____ 
Bright _____ 
Careful _____ 
Careless _____ 
Cold  _____ 
Complex _____ 
Conscientious _____ 
Considerate _____ 
Cooperative _____ 
Creative _____ 
Daring _____ 
Deep  _____ 
Demanding _____ 
Disorganized _____ 
Distrustful _____ 
Efficient _____ 
Emotional _____ 
Energetic _____ 
Envious _____ 
Extraverted _____ 
Fearful _____ 
Fretful _____ 
Generous _____ 
Haphazard _____ 
Harsh _____ 
Helpful _____ 
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High-strung _____ 
Imaginative _____ 
Imperceptive _____ 
Imperturbable _____ 
Impractical _____ 
Inconsistent _____ 
Inefficient _____ 
Inhibited _____ 
Innovative _____ 
Insecure _____ 
Intellectual _____ 
Introspective _____ 
Introverted _____ 
Irritable _____ 
Jealous _____ 
Kind  _____ 
Moody _____ 
Neat  _____ 
Negligent _____ 
Nervous _____ 
Organized _____ 
Philosophical _____ 
Pleasant _____ 
Practical _____ 
Prompt _____ 
Quaint _____ 
Relaxed _____ 
Reserved _____ 
Rude  _____ 
Self-pitying _____ 
Selfish _____ 
Shallow _____ 
Shy  _____ 
Simple _____ 
Sloppy _____ 
Steady _____ 
Sympathetic _____ 
Systematic _____ 
Talkative _____ 
Temperamental _____ 
Thorough _____ 
Timid _____ 
Touchy _____ 
Trustful _____ 
Uncooperative _____ 
84 
 
Uncreative _____ 
Unemotional _____ 
Unexcitable _____ 
Unimaginative _____ 
Unintelligent _____ 
Unkind _____ 
Unrestrained _____ 
Unsophisticated _____ 
Unsympathetic _____ 
Verbal _____ 
Vigorous _____ 
Warm _____ 
Withdrawn _____ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
85 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX G: 
Part One Consent Form 
 
86 
 
Researcher’s Name: Bradlee Gamblin 
 
Title: Personality and the Olympics (Part One) 
 
I am a graduate student at Eastern Kentucky University. I am conducting a study 
looking at psychological measures in relation to the 2012 Olympics. In part one, you will 
be asked to fill out four short personality surveys. Part one should take no longer than 15 
minutes. 
Your participation is voluntary and you have the right to refuse to answer any 
question. You may also withdraw from the study at any time without giving prior notice 
and without penalty. Your responses are completely anonymous. 
After completing part one of the study, you will be given a debriefing form 
explaining the purpose of the surveys you have completed. You will be given a full 
debriefing explaining the purpose of the entire study after completing part two. If you 
still wish to participate in the study, we will now begin. 
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Personality and the Olympics, Part One 
 
Part one of this study was concerned with the levels people score on personality 
measures. Specifically, in part one of this study, you completed the Need for Closure 
Scale (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011), the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965), 
and the Conscientiousness and Extraversion subscales of the Big-Five Personality Test 
(Goldberg, 1992). Need for closure refers to the motivational need for individuals to find 
clarity, definition, and structure in their environments and their interactions with others. 
Along with Conscientiousness and Extraversion, the other three factors in the Big-Five 
are Openness to experience, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism. 
Thank you for participating in this study. Psychological research is not possible 
without the cooperation of participants like you. If you are interested in research related 
to these questionnaires or would like to know your scores on the measures, feel free to 
contact the researcher listed below. 
 
   
   
   
  Bradlee Gamblin 
  bradlee_gamblin@mymail.eku.edu 
 
References 
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University Press. 
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Researcher’s Name: Bradlee Gamblin 
Title: Personality and the Olympics (Part Two) 
I am a graduate student at Eastern Kentucky University. I am conducting a study 
in which you will be asked to read an article about the 2012 Summer Olympics and give 
your opinions on a few questions. This study should take no longer than 30 minutes. 
Your participation is voluntary and you have the right to refuse to answer any 
question. You may also withdraw from the study at any time without giving prior notice 
and without penalty; however, you will not be given credit for your participation. You 
responses are completely anonymous. 
After completing the study, you will be given a debriefing form explaining the 
purpose of this study. If you still wish to participate in this study, we will begin. 
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Just hours after the close of the Olympics, United States shot putter Claudio Mendoza 
was stripped of his gold Monday in the first case of an athlete losing a medal for doping 
at the 2012 London Games. 
 
The International Olympic Committee said Mendoza, a former world champion, tested 
positive for steroids both before and after winning the shot put last week for his first 
Olympic gold. 
 
"Catching cheats like this sends a message to all those who dope that we will catch 
them," IOC spokesman Mark Adams said. 
 
A hearing was held Sunday, a few hours before the closing ceremony, attended by three 
United States team officials. They told the IOC that Mendoza had been tested in the 
United States on July 25, July 26 and Aug. 1, and the results were negative. The athlete 
arrived in London on Aug. 4 and went straight to the athlete village. 
 
Mendoza told the American media that he had done nothing wrong. 
 
"I do not understand where it could come from," he told BBC. "I'm looking like an idiot 
to take this in heading for the Games and knowing that it is so easy to be tested. 
Nonsense. I'm being tested every month, every week. 
 
"I hope for the best. The most important thing for me is to clear my reputation. I've been 
in the sport for so many years and have never faced any claims. And now at the major 
event and after the gold medal? I do not understand it." 
 
Track and field's governing body, the IAAF, will consider further action against 
Mendoza, who could face larger consequences within the sport ranging from a multi-
thousand dollar fine to a lifetime ban. 
 
 
(Pictured: American shot putter Claudio Mendoza accepting his gold medal) 
 
Figure 4. “Claudio Mendoza” (Athlete Used For Ingroup News Article). 
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Just hours after the close of the Olympics, shot putter Claudio Mendoza was stripped of 
his gold Monday in the first case of an athlete losing a medal for doping at the 2012 
London Games. 
 
The International Olympic Committee said Mendoza, a former world champion, tested 
positive for steroids both before and after winning the shot put last week for his first 
Olympic gold. 
 
”Catching cheats like this sends a message to all those who dope that we will catch 
them,” IOC spokesman Mark Adams said. 
 
A hearing was held Sunday, a few hours before the closing ceremony, attended by three 
team officials. They told the IOC that Mendoza had been tested on July 25, July 26 and 
Aug. 1, and the results were negative. The athlete arrived in London on Aug. 4 and went 
straight to the athlete village. 
 
Mendoza told the media that he had done nothing wrong. 
 
”I do not understand where it could come from,” he told BBC. “I‟m looking like an idiot 
to take this in heading for the Games and knowing that it is so easy to be tested. 
Nonsense. I‟m being tested every month, every week. 
 
”I hope for the best. The most important thing for me is to clear my reputation. I‟ve been 
in the sport for so many years and have never faced any claims. And now at the major 
event and after the gold medal? I do not understand it.” 
 
Track and field‟s governing body, the IAAF, will consider further action against 
Mendoza, who could face larger consequences within the sport ranging from a multi-
thousand dollar fine to a lifetime ban. 
 
 
(Pictured: Shot putter Mendoza accepting his gold medal) 
 
Figure 5. “Claudio Mendoza” (Athlete Used for Outgroup News Article). 
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Summary Sheet 
 
Please summarize the article that you have just read. Include as much detail as you can, 
but do not re-write the article word for word. You will have five minutes to complete 
your summary. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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Demographics Sheet 
 
Please indicate your… 
 
Race: 
_____ Asian 
_____ African-American 
_____ Caucasian 
_____ Hispanic 
_____ Other (Please specify): _____________________________ 
 
Gender: ______________                                           Age: ______ 
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The Moderating Effects of Need for Closure on the Common Ingroup Identity 
Model 
 
This study was designed to test the relationship between need for closure, a 
cognitive need to find quick, concrete answers (Kruglanski, Webster, & Klem, 1993), and 
the Common Ingroup Identity Model, a technique for reducing prejudice by inducing 
members of different groups to think of themselves as one, all-inclusive group (Gaertner 
& Dovidio, 2000). The present study is looking at the moderating effects of need for 
closure on the Common Ingroup Identity Model. Previous research has shown that need 
for closure moderates the effectiveness of intergroup contact, a separate prejudice 
reduction technique (Dhont, Roets, & Van Hiel, 2011).  
 
In this study, participants were randomly assigned to both an ingroup condition 
and a closure condition. Participants read a news article describing a simulated drug 
doping case from the 2012 Summer Olympics. Some participants were told that the 
athlete was from the United States; others were given no country designation. Both 
groups were then asked to complete a questionnaire concerning the guilt of the athlete in 
question. Participants in the high need for closure condition were given time pressure by 
being told they needed to finish the study in a hurry, while participants in the low need 
for closure condition were not given this instruction. I predict that participants in the high 
need for closure condition will be more responsive to the Common Ingroup Identity 
Model than participants in the low need for closure condition. I also predict that this will 
be moderated by dispositional need for closure, measured by the Need for Closure Scale 
(Roets & Van Hiel, 2011), which participants filled out online. 
 
Thank you for participating in my study. Psychological research is not possible 
without the cooperation of participants like you. If you are interested in research on 
reducing prejudice, feel free to contact me or consult the references listed below. 
 
  Bradlee Gamblin 
  bradlee_gamblin@mymail.eku.edu 
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Researcher’s Name: Bradlee Gamblin 
 
Title: College Student Opinions, Attitudes, and Personalities 
I am a graduate student at Eastern Kentucky University conducting a study for my 
graduate thesis. In this study, you will complete four short personality surveys which will 
be used in my thesis project. Your participation will take no longer than 30 minutes.  
Your participation is voluntary and you have the right to refuse to answer any 
question. You may also withdraw from the study at any time without giving prior notice 
and without penalty. Your responses are completely anonymous. 
After completing the study, you will be given a debriefing form explaining the 
purpose of the surveys you have completed. If you still wish to participate in this study, 
we will now begin. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
103 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX P: 
Online Debriefing Form 
 
104 
 
College Student Opinions, Attitudes, and Personalities 
 
This study was concerned with the levels people score on personality measures. 
Specifically, you completed the Need for Closure Scale (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011), the 
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965), and the Conscientiousness and 
Extraversion subscales of the Big-Five Personality Test (Goldberg, 1992). Need for 
closure refers to the motivational need for individuals to find clarity, definition, and 
structure in their environments and their interactions with others. Along with 
Conscientiousness and Extraversion, the other three factors in the Big-Five are Openness 
to experience, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism. 
 
Thank you for participating in this study. Psychological research is not possible 
without the cooperation of participants like you. If you are interested in research related 
to these questionnaires or would like to know your scores on the measures, feel free to 
contact the researcher listed below. 
 
  Bradlee Gamblin 
  bradlee_gamblin@mymail.eku.edu 
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Researcher’s Name: Bradlee Gamblin 
Title: Psychology at the Olympic Games 
I am a graduate student at Eastern Kentucky University. I am conducting a study 
looking at psychology in relation to the 2012 London Olympics. In this study, you will be 
asked to read an article about the 2012 Summer Olympics and give your opinions on a 
few questions. This study should take no longer than 30 minutes. 
Your participation is voluntary and you have the right to refuse to answer any 
question. You may also withdraw from the study at any time without giving prior notice 
and without penalty. You responses are completely anonymous. 
After completing the study, you will be given a debriefing form explaining the 
purpose of the study. If you still wish to participate in the study, we will begin. 
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The Moderating Effects of Need for Closure on the Common Ingroup Identity 
Model 
 
This study was designed to test the relationship between need for closure, a 
cognitive need to find quick, concrete answers (Kruglanski, Webster, & Klem, 1993), and 
the Common Ingroup Identity Model, a technique for reducing prejudice by inducing 
members of different groups to think of themselves as one, all-inclusive group (Gaertner 
& Dovidio, 2000). The present study is looking at the moderating effects of need for 
closure on the Common Ingroup Identity Model. Previous research has shown that need 
for closure moderates the effectiveness of intergroup contact, a separate prejudice 
reduction technique (Dhont, Roets, & Van Hiel, 2011).  
 
In this study, participants were randomly assigned to both an ingroup condition 
and a closure condition. Participants read a news article describing a simulated drug 
doping case from the 2012 Summer Olympics. Some participants were told that the 
athlete was from the United States; others were given no country designation. Both 
groups were then asked to complete a questionnaire concerning the guilt of the athlete in 
question. Participants in the high need for closure condition were given time pressure by 
being told they needed to finish the study in a hurry, while participants in the low need 
for closure condition were not given this instruction. I predict that participants in the high 
need for closure condition will be more responsive to the Common Ingroup Identity 
Model than participants in the low need for closure condition. I also predict that this will 
be moderated by dispositional need for closure, measured by the Need for Closure Scale 
(Roets & Van Hiel, 2011), which participants filled out online at an earlier date. 
  
Thank you for participating in my study. Psychological research is not possible 
without the cooperation of participants like you. If you are interested in research on 
reducing prejudice, feel free to contact me or consult the references listed below. 
 
  Bradlee Gamblin 
  bradlee_gamblin@mymail.eku.edu 
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